Highest bid wins, pays own bid.
- Best for
- NFT sales · fundraising · one-off assets
- Bidder strategy
- Strategic shading, bid below true valuation
Powered by ArciumeBidz is a sealed-bid auction protocol where every bid is encrypted client-side, kept opaque onchain, and processed by Arcium's MPC cluster, so no validator, no other bidder, and not even the auction creator can read or front-run your bid before settlement.
Bids encrypted with this pubkey are decryptable only via threshold MPC across the cluster. No single node holds the full key.
Every transparent bid is a leak. Every plaintext mempool transaction is an invitation to extract. The auction is no longer a price-discovery mechanism, it’s a game for insiders.
MEV extracted in 2024
When bid amounts hit the mempool, MEV bots front-run, sandwich, or reorder transactions to extract value from honest participants.
Privacy in current auctions
In open ascending auctions, every bid is visible. Retail bidders are at a permanent disadvantage versus actors monitoring the chain in real time.
NFT auctions affected by shilling
Auction creators and coordinated groups place shill bids to inflate prices, suppress competition, or extract from legitimate participants.
Vickrey auctions onchain, until now
Vickrey auctions are theoretically optimal for honest bidding, but require bid secrecy. Without MPC, they are impossible to run trustlessly onchain.
Every step in the bid lifecycle is designed so no single party, not the creator, not validators, not Arcium itself, can read or front-run your bid.
Your bid is encrypted in your browser using the Arcium cluster’s threshold public key. The plaintext never leaves your machine.
The encrypted bid and a SOL deposit are stored onchain in a per-bidder PDA. Nobody, including validators, can read the bid.
At deadline, anyone calls close_auction. Arcium’s MPC cluster runs the winner-determination circuit across ciphertexts.
The cluster posts the cluster-signed result via callback. The program verifies the signature, settles the winner, opens refunds.
Each type uses a different MPC circuit, but all share the same property: bids are computed without ever being decrypted.
The protocol guarantees you a refund or your item, no matter what fails.
Bid deposits live in a program-derived address. Neither the creator, eBidz Labs, nor any admin has withdrawal rights.
close_auction is callable by anyone after the deadline. No trusted crank or relayer is needed for liveness.
If the cluster fails to deliver within MPC_TIMEOUT, force_cancel becomes callable, every bidder gets refunded.
The Anchor program, Arcium circuits, and the entire frontend are open source and reproducibly buildable.
The frontend encrypts your bid using the Arcium cluster’s threshold X25519 public key. The encrypted bid is then submitted to the Solana program. Only a quorum of MPC nodes acting together can decrypt, and even then, only inside the MPC circuit, never to a single node.
If MPC times out(default 24h) elapses after auction closes without a settled result, the force cancel instruction becomes callable by anyone. It refunds every bidder’s deposit and returns the item to the creator. Bidders never have funds permanently locked.
No. The creator has no read access to encrypted bid data, they’re just another participant from the protocol’s perspective. They configure the auction; they cannot influence or peek at it.
SNARKs prove things about already-known data. The hard part of a sealed-bid auction is computing over data nobody has access to. MPC gives us correctness and privacy on encrypted inputs, exactly the primitive we need.
A standard Solana transaction for bid submission (~5,000 lamports), plus rent for the Bid PDA. Settlement is a single Arcium callback. Total cost per auction is roughly equivalent to a token transfer + a small CPI call.
No. Bids are immutable once submitted. Raising a bid would require topping up the plaintext deposit, which leaks an upper bound on the new amount. For Vickrey auctions this isn’t a problem, truthful bidding is already optimal.